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Apr 9, 202110 min read

Independence of Kosovo: does it set a dangerous precedent?


INDEPENDENCE OF KOSOVO: DOES IT SET A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT? By Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Renaud FRANCOIS, Research Associate at ESISC Broadcastlive on February17 by most of the Western television channels, we watched the joy mixed with pride and the communionof a people celebrating an independence that was so much desired for so long, and it wasboth beautiful and moving. Apparently there could be no doubt about the wish of the 90% of Albanians who populate Kosovo to separatethemselves from Serbia and form their own state.The images from the streets of Pristina,the flags waving in all directions, the smilesand the hugging andkissing spoke for themselves. This independence appeared to be inevitable for a long time. It was soon recognised by many countries, including the United States and 21 member countries of the European Union. But apart from the sympathywhich it elicits,should we truly be congratulatory and rejoice over this? The recognition is problematic in terms of principles and carries concerns of a strategic nature. We have to wonder what will be the consequences of the proclamation of independence on triangular relations between Russia, the United States and the EuropeanUnion. Such are the issues that arise now that the previously already very tough climate of relationsbetween the Western countries and Russia show evidence of a clear heating up of the defunctCold War. 1) A brief historical reminder1 · Slobodan Milosevic sets the fuse alight The first manifestations of tensionbetween the Albanian majority and the Serb minority go back to 1987. But it was the 1996 decisionof Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic to abolish the province’sautonomy that set the powder alight. Disappointed by the absenceof any reaction from the West and frustrated by the ineffectiveness of the policy of passive resistance recommended by their charismatic leader, Ibrahim Rugova, certain Albanians in Kosovo turned to violenceas the only means of challenging the Serbian regime. The first step in this direction was the creation of the

‘Kosovo Liberation Army’ (KLA) better known by its Albanianaronym UÇK (Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovësen). It launched a campaignof terror targetingand eliminating Serb leaders, police and border guards. The authorities in Belgraderesponded with severe police andmilitary counter measures. · The slow awakening of the international community In 1998, the international communityemerged from its torpor and created a ‘contact group’composed of Germany,the United States,France, the United Kingdomand Russia. The setback of the negotiations held under the aegis of the contact group and the approachof an imminent humanitarian catastrophe prompted NA TO to intervene by waging an air campaign of bombardmentcalled ‘ Operation Allied Force.’ · A longercampaign than anticipated The operations were supposed to be limited to symbolicbombardment lasting 3 or 4 days to bring Belgrade to the negotiating table, as occurred when an end was put to the war in Bosnia. But in fact the bombing lasted 78 days. In total,the NATO air forcescarried out more than 60,000 air sortiesand more than 800 ground-to-air missiles were fired by the Serbian air defences. Some NATO ground units were concentrated in Macedonia, as well as a US Army brigade which landed, with difficulty, in Albania.These units constituted the advanceelements of the future Kosovo Force - KFOR. The air strikes lasted right up to the conclusion on June 3, 1999 of an agreement between the FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia and the special envoys of the EuropeanUnion (Martti Ahtisaari, at the time, President of Finland)and of Russia (the former Prime MinisterViktor Chernomyrdin). They came to presentto Slobodan Milosevic, SerbianPresident and, since 1997, President of the Federal Republicof Yougoslavia, the demands of the G8 to put an end to the Kosovo conflict. On June 10, 1999, the bombardment ended and the Serb forces made their retreatfrom Kosovo. The provincewas taken over by the international force authorised by the United Nations, KFOR, within the framework of the operation ‘Joint Guardian.’ It was placed under the administration of the Acting Missionof the United Nations in Kosovoon the basis of Resolution 1244 of the UNSecurity Council. · Human and political results Though the human losses of this conflict were not clearly established, many organisations estimate that 10,000 Kosovars were killed by Serb forces.The air bombardments caused the death of between500 and 1,500 civiliansand of more than 650 Yugoslav soldiers. The NGO Human RightsWatch2 estimatesthat the Serb forcesexpelled nearly 850,000 Albanians from Kosovo toMacedonia and Albania, and that many hundreds of thousands of others were displaced. In total, nearly 80 % of the population of Kosovo had been driven from their homes. The damage to the reputation of SlobodanMilosevic caused him to lose the Presidential election in September2000. He was arrestedon March 31, 2001 and sent for trial before the International Criminal Court for ex-Yugoslavia, but he died beforethe end of his trial in 2006.


2) Consequences of this independence If we want to have a precise idea of the consequences of such an independence, we must examinethem through the prism of the tripartite relations among the three principalactors in this diplomaticimbroglio: Russia, the United Statesand the European Union. · Moscow sees red… For the future ex-President of Russia and soon-to-be Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, who spoke before the summitof the Community of IndependentStates (CIS) 3 on February 22, the case of Kosovo ‘constitutes a disturbing precedent which does harm to the whole system of international relations that has been developedover centuries. At the end of the day, it is a double-edged sword which could one day turn againstone or another of the countries whichhave recognised this independence.’ AlthoughSerbia hardly has the resourcesto react, that is not the case with Russia. It could not prevent the proclamation of independence of Kosovo,but – togetherwith China – it can oppose its admissionto the UN by using its right of veto. This is a new motive for confrontation with Washington and it is certain that Moscow will seek to obtaincompensation or to take revenge in one manneror another. And there is no shortage of opportunities. Alreadybefore this independence and during the whole period of negotiations led by Martti Ahtisaari, the UN SpecialEnvoy, Russian diplomacy began to argue over the ‘dangerous precedent’ that the international community, under Western pressure, was preparing to ratify.For Russian Minister of Foreign AffairsSergei Lavrov, ‘the unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo could unleash a chain reactionat the same time both inside and outsidethe Balkans.’ 4 Sergei Lavrov was careful not to specify the areas about which he was thinking. However, the message was sufficiently clear for the international community to understand that he was making an allusion to the many secessionist trends which are sprinkled across the Balkans as well as the separatist conflicts of Abkhazia,Southern Ossetia on Georgianterritory and of the Transnistria in Moldava. All the peoples, provinces or minorities which aspire to independence on the five continents will now be able to claim the example of Kosovo. Russia will brandishit to support, when it sees an interestin doing so, the secessionist aspirations of the regions or autonomous republics of the states which emerged from the Sovietempire. In the Balkans,the Serbs of Bosnia, the Albaniansof Macedonia, the 10% of Kosovar Serbs could now legitimately claim the right recognised for the Albaniansof Kosovo. Finally, within the European Union, the Catalans,the Basques, the TurkishCypriots, the Flemish and the Hungarians of Slovakiacould tomorrow take advantage of this. This is why neitherSpain nor Slovakia, nor Cyprus norGreece will recogniseKosovo. And that is not all. Russia supports Serbia in its rejection of this independence and will now have all the means to lean heavilyand for a long time on the Balkans,where the future calls for integration one day into the European Union. · … getting caught up in contradictions … On February20, Konstantin Kosachev, the president of the Foreign AffairsCommittee of the Duma, implicitly admitted the innocenceof the threatsto recognise the independence of Abkhaziaand Southern Ossetia. For him, Moscow has more to lose than to gain and such recognition ‘would unleash a grave crisis within the CIS, would exacerbate relations with NATO, the EUand the United States.’ The most obvious contradiction rests in the fact that it is difficult for Moscow to present itself on the one hand, as favouring Serb terrritorial integrity and, on the other hand, to advocate the seizureof Georgian and Azerbaijani territory, not to mentionits being a directactor in the occupation of a part of Moldovaterritory in contempt of international law. If Moscow focused solely on the cases of Abkhaziaand of SouthernOssetia, the Moscow authorities would give up the argumentof the ‘precedent having universalreach’ that Kosovo amounts to. Furthermore, by acting in this manner,they would expose themselves pointlessly to an angry responsefrom the international community. Their troops are already deployed in these Georgianprovinces (in the framework of a tripartite peacekeeping force) and the political leaders in place are in their pay. The maintenance of the present status quo perfectly suits Moscow, which thereby keeps a powerfulmeans of applyingpressure on Tbilisi.By maintaining the freeze on these separatist conflicts on Georgianterritory, the Russian authoritiesstrongly weaken the cause of Georgia’s joining NATO. · … but not to losebusiness sense Having arrived in Belgrade on February25 to reassure the Serb authorities on the unfailing support of Moscow, the First DeputyPrime Minister and Chairman of the Board of the Russian gas giant Gazprom and most likely future President of Russia,Dmitri Medvedev, used the visit to sign an important agreement worth 1.5 billion dollars over the construction of a gas pipeline across the whole length of the Serb territory.5 More discreetly, the Russian authorities announced the purchase of the Serbian national oil companyNaftna Industrija Srbije (NIS) for a knock-down price of 400 millionEuros, i.e., 1/5 of its value. During this flash trip in the Balkans, the same Dimitri Medvedev made a stopoverin Budapest, where he received the supportof the Hungarian authoritiesfor the implementation of the South Stream gas pipelineproject. An agreementon this matteris expected to be signed in Moscow on February 28.6 This project,having a value of nearly 8 billion Euros, has alreadybeen approved in Bulgariaand Serbia, and it opens the doors to Europewide to Gazprom.This pipeline could spell the death of the Europeanpipeline project called Nabucco. · The Westerners face up to their responsibilities Well before the deadlineof December 10 to reach an agreementwith Belgrade over Kosovo, Washington andBrussels became convincedthat independence was theonly viable solution. · Washington is assuaged… During her visit to Pristina on February21, Rosemary DiCarlo, the AmericanAssistant Under Secretary of State, said laconically on the airwaves of the radio station Écho of Moscow7 that the plan of the UN SpecialRepresentative was the only possible outcome of the Kosovo conflict. ‘It was no longer possibleto make the status quo last. One had to take a decision making it possible to resolve the question of the status of Kosovo ,’ she added before expressing satisfaction that ‘the events of February17 developed in a peaceful manner and withoutincidents.’

For his part, the American Secretary of Defense,Robert Gates, visiting the capital of Indonesia at the time, did not think that the recognition of the independence of Kosovowould be able to intensifyseparatist trends in variousregions around the world. ‘I don’t believethat this can provokea domino effect,’he said during a press conference, adding that this was ‘a unique situation in a class by itself.’8 The American position, quite restrained despite the outbreakof violence which, in Belgrade, led to the sackingof its embassy, can be explainedby the fact that the UN SecurityCouncil is getting ready to discuss new sanctions against Iran9, and Washington needs Russian support to succeed in getting a new resolution. Anotherexplanation seems to lie in the Americandifficulties with putting in place their missiledefence shield in Europe. For Joanne Landy and Thomas Harrison, in an articlepublished by Foreign Policy in Focus10, the setting up of this shield is encountering more and more opposition. Both on the external level, where the Polishand Czech populations are beginning to mobiliseagainst what is presentedby the authors of the article as the start of a ‘new Cold War,’ and on the domestic level, where the AmericanCongress has made known its skepticism and doubts by stripping160 million dollarsform the budget for this programme. The abandonment or puttingto sleep of this project,which is considered to be a casus belli by Moscow, would certainly be very much appreciated by the Russian authorities andcould serve asuseful bargaining chips for the thorny problem of Iran. · … and the common Foreignand Security Policy of Europe encounters areas of turbulence The statement of the SloveneMinister of Foreign Affairs,whose country has presentlyassumed the Presidency of the EuropeanUnion, sums up the Europeans’ embarrassment. He proudly stated that the EU had a common position.11 And this common position is very simple:the 27 are free to decide individually whether they recognise the independence of Kosovo or not. In aword, the 27 have agreednot to agree! Certain Europeancountries, including Spain, Greece, Slovakia and Cyprus, are very sensitive to the main argumentadvanced by Serbia and Russia:territorial integrity should have priorityover the principleof self-determination. Confronted by regionalseparatist movements, they believe that thegranting of independence to Kosovo represents a dangerousprecedent. The rallying of these countries to the Ahtisaariplan and to the mission of the EU planning team in Kosovo was thus made dependenton a new resolution within the Security Council which would be devotedto the uniqueness of the Kosovo case. In this context we see how alarmist talk concerning the credibility of the common foreignpolicy has multiplied since the end of 2007. ‘The externalpolicy of the European Union was born in the Balkans, and it should not perish in the Balkans’12 Bernard Kouchner, French Minister of Foreign Affairs,and his British counterpart, David Miliband, warned in an articlein Le Monde. As regardsJavier Solana, the high representative for the Foreign Policy and Common Security of the Union, he said on October 3, 2007, that ‘the EU should be ready to take over from theUnited Nations as from December.’ For some Europeancountries, reducing their energy dependence on Russia runs through the Caucasus.But it also runs throughthe Balkans, across which the hydrocarbons from the

Caspianwill be carried toWestern Europe. In this framework, the stability of the Balkans and the integration into the EU are stakes of strategic importance. Unfortunately, the interestsof the Union could be halted before those of the individual states, carrying a new blow to the ideal of a powerful Europe equipped with a common foreignpolicy.



3) Conclusion


On a strictly legal level, the history of the independence of Kosovo started out with a violation of the international rules forbidding the use of force. The ‘à la carte’ use of international law by the various protagonists of the war over Kosovo has been flagrant. In Westerncapitals, they call it a case of force majeure,adding, in a whisper, that, after all, Serbia lost the war and every defeat has its price. That is all true, but you do not violate international lawwith impunity in a worldwhich has so much need of it.


It is true that in 2005, the 150 heads of state participating in the world summit of the UnitedNations adopted unanimously ‘The Responsibility to Protect concept.’ This conceptformalises the conditions in which the international community has the obligation to intervene, using force if necessary, when a countryis unable or refuses to protect its population and when crimes against humanity are beingcommitted.


As the first collateral victim of this conflict,international law will also be the last one. This independence tramples on the law which guaranteesevery member state of the UnitedNations, including Serbia, respect for its borders and its territorial integrity. In the defunct Yugoslav Federation, Kosovo was not a constituent republic having the right to withdrawfrom the Federation. This province was an integral part of the Republicof Serbia and its secession, in this respect, is illegal.


This second violation, far from cancelling out the effectsof the first, only amplify them. Though it may not create, stricto sensu, a dangerousprecedent, it dangerously complicates the situationin a region that has long been considered as potentially explosive. It’s not for nothingthat it still bears the nickname of the ‘powder keg of the Balkans.’



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